Once, the haredi parties were aligned with neither left nor right, but allied themselves with whatever party could cater to their particular interests. That’s no longer the case, as Amit Segal explains:

Israel’s ultra-Orthodox political strategists are currently split into two camps: those who believe the storm over mandatory military enlistment will pass, allowing a future centrist-left government quietly to secure exemptions through legal channels—something a right-wing coalition can’t easily manage; and those who recognize they’re facing a historic crossroads—not just about exiting this government, but about their long-term participation in future coalitions.

The haredi parties have long ceased being merely swing votes; they’re deeply embedded within the right-wing camp. Anyone expecting the ultra-Orthodox public to accept prolonged partnerships with centrist-left governments is deluding himself. . . . The current opposition, loosely united by their opposition to Netanyahu and the ultra-Orthodox parties, will find it extremely challenging to deliver a lenient conscription law—even if they genuinely desire one.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”