If the 1973 Yom Kippur War provides the template for understanding the Israel-Hamas war that began on October 7, 2023, the 1967 Six-Day War might—as Luttwak suggests—provide the model for the present phase of the conflict between Israel and Iran. Iran was unprepared militarily for the assault on its nuclear installations that Israel has been threatening for over a decade, despite the facts that it has no air force to speak of and that Israel destroyed its most important air-defense capabilities in October—while demonstrating that IDF jets had the ability to strike Iranian territory. And not only that, Michael Doran writes, but its leading generals

knew—without the slightest illusion—that Israel had the capability and resolve to kill them. [They] saw the Israeli air force bury Hizballah’s Hassan Nasrallah in his bunker, hundreds of meters beneath the streets of Beirut. They saw the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh vaporized in a presidential guesthouse—in Tehran, no less. Yet on Thursday night, they came home as usual and went to sleep—unguarded, unworried, carefree. Like insurance salesmen and bank tellers following their daily routines, it never occurred to them that they might not wake in the morning. But they didn’t.

In 1967, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser made a similar mistake.

Doran goes on to explain how the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was lulled into complacency:

When in history had an American president not succumbed to the temptation to negotiate with Iran rather than apply military pressure? Experience had taught Khamenei that the redlines of American presidents were invitations to begin haggling. Americans can be led around like trained animals, always chasing the mirage of a deal.

The Iranians’ analysis was, in nearly every respect, correct. They saw the gap between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu. They understood that Trump wanted a deal and was restraining Israel. They calculated that Israel could not act alone.

They were right about all of it. Except for one thing: Trump meant what he said. Netanyahu took everything the Iranians understood—everything that was true—and used it to hide the two truths that mattered: Trump will not let Iran get the bomb; and Netanyahu was prepared to act boldly on that knowledge.

The heart of the deception was not a lie and not even a misdirection—it was the absence of deception entirely.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.