With Iran now on the defensive, and its proxies badly battered, and with the IDF now in control of much of Gaza, Hamas finds itself more isolated than ever. Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib suggests a series of steps that could help increase the pressure on the terrorist group, and bring the war to a speedier conclusion:

Freeze/seize resources and funds in Qatar and elsewhere: although Hamas has faced financial sanctions, the group has leveraged its presence in Qatar, Turkey, and other countries to circumvent restrictions and utilize the financial networks and systems of these nations to amass significant sums of money. If this rainy-day fund that the group needs to rejuvenate and replenish its ranks is threatened, it could be pressured into capitulating.

Make the Palestinian Authority officially declare Hamas a terrorist organization.

Use the Arab League to delegitimize Hamas and create an Arab Gaza Force: just like they did following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Arab League should delegitimize Hamas’s actions in Gaza. . . . The resolution should also call for establishing an Arab policing force whose mission is to help re-establish law and order in the coastal enclave after the war, as part of a transitional period.

Issue INTERPOL Red Notices for Hamas’s political leaders outside of Gaza.

Offer a publicly transparent and comprehensive off-ramp for Hamas personnel in Gaza: members, fighters, leaders, and all who are involved with the terror group’s infrastructure should be offered varying degrees of incentives to give up, move on, walk away, turn over weapons, provide valuable information, demobilize, and reform.

What’s most shocking about these common-sense proposals is that none were undertaken in the early months of the war.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.