According to recent reports, Syria and Israel are in talks over some sort of security agreement, although it may fall short of full normalization. The U.S. dropped most of its sanctions on the country on Monday, in what might be a related gesture of good will. And Israel recently demonstrated its utility to Damascus by arresting several Iranian agents in southern Syria and confiscating their arms.

Robert Silverman offers some reflections:

[W]hat’s needed are some confidence-building interim steps between Syria and Israel that might eventually lead to a full normalization agreement. For generations the government-controlled media in Syria have inundated its public with hatred of Israel. The new government—if indeed it is interested in moving forward with Israel—would be wise to take interim steps to prepare its public for a major change towards its neighbor, “the Zionist entity.”

Silverman addresses some other issues as well, including the U.S. intervention in the twelve-day war:

Israelis are naturally very happy with the decision of President Trump to call in the B-2 bombers to end the Iran campaign. Yet, an unhappy aspect of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s legacy is a level of dependence on the United States that would have alarmed his great predecessors David Ben-Gurion and Menachem Begin. One question I had . . . is why Israel itself doesn’t have heavy bombers, only fighter-bombers. The “massive ordinance penetrator” bomb that only a heavy bomber like the B-2 can deliver is surely within Israel’s technical competence.

In other words, getting this sort of American help has drawbacks for Israel, which has always prided itself on fighting its wars on its own.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.