Iran failed to mount a catastrophic retaliation against Israel because most of Hizballah’s missile stockpiles had been destroyed; because Hamas is spent as an offensive fighting force; because Syria (thanks in large part to the collapse of Hizballah) is no longer an Iranian satrapy; because Iran’s militias in Iraq are themselves deterred from attacking Israel; and because even the Houthis have lost some of their capabilities.

But, as David Horovitz explains, those circumstances heightened some dangers even as they reduced others:

The regime in Tehran responded by further accelerating its efforts to attain the bomb. It expanded its stockpiles of 60-percent enriched uranium. It made significant progress on weaponization. Its key scientists were conducting tests and simulations that underlined how close they were to completing the program.

At the same time, Iran stepped up its missile-production capabilities. As Israel has publicly stated, Iran had built an arsenal of some 2,500 highly potent missiles, many with one-ton warheads capable of immense devastation, and was on track to have 4,000 by March 2026. And 8,000 by 2027. A conventional missile threat was becoming an existential danger, capable of overwhelming Israel’s defenses, wreaking untenable death and destruction across Israel, and, if Israel was caught unawares, preventing the Israeli military from mustering an effective response. Together with its thousands of drones, Iran was aiming, for instance, to target Israel’s air bases, ensuring that the air force simply couldn’t take off to fight back.

What was central to the realization of Iran’s goal, however, was that it strike first and take Israel by surprise.

One of Israel’s remarkable achievements in the twelve-day war was that it prevented Iran from responding effectively—and not only through defensive means:

The IDF had assessed that Iran would try to fire 300–500 missiles in its initial response to an Israeli attack, and that it was possible it could launch as many as 300 in the first fifteen minutes. . . . In the event, Iran managed to fire precisely no missiles in the first eighteen hours after Israel’s strike. It had known Israel was coming, but it did not know Israel was coming that night. Israel attacked just before 3 a.m.; Iran fired its first two missile barrages, of some 50 missiles each, shortly after 9 p.m.

Iran’s ballistic-missile program is greatly degraded. It is believed to still have some 700–1,000 missiles and fewer than 200 of its original 400 launchers. But the IDF targeted not only missiles and launchers, but the tunnels from which they emerge to fire, and the factories that make them and their components. Indeed, the IDF targeted innumerable elements of Iran’s entire military manufacturing array.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.