One of the major differences between now and the 1930s, writes Ben Cohen, is that today most European governments are neither anti-Semitic nor unsympathetic to their Jewish populations. But Europe is in the midst of a growing social and political crisis, and there is an increasing possibility that the current political class will lose power. Cohen writes:

An important aspect of the threat that Jews in Europe face lies in the fact that they are closely associated with the political class that . . . is now in danger. Over many decades, their communal representatives have cultivated the leaders of the main parties; they are consulted by ministries and think tanks; they have advanced relations with Israel in culture, business, and politics. They share the foundational conviction that the disaster of Nazism can never be repeated. That is why the current French prime minister and the current British home secretary speak as they do. That is why Frans Timmermans, the European Commission vice president, said this week that Jewish fears pose “a huge challenge to the very foundations of European integration.”

But we have no certainty, even ten years from now, that their successors, of potentially very different political stripes, will say the same.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.