In the Indian city of Alibaug, located some 60 miles south of Mumbai, a street-side drink stand that sells sodas produced and bottled by its owner is considered a major local attraction. It is also a persistent remnant of Alibaug’s Jewish history. Namita Devidayal writes:

With its Mangalore-tiled roof and Marathi signs, this could be any other drink stand [in this part of India], if it weren’t for the star of David and pictures of Moses that hang on the wall. This quaint beverage stop, which serves an array of delicious bespoke carbonated drinks like ginger-lemon soda, ice-cream soda, and masala soda, was founded 80 years ago by a Bene Israel Jew, Daniel Samson Digodkar.

Like many of his brethren—at one time there was a population of several thousand Jews in this area, and a synagogue still stands tall in Alibaug—his first name, Daniel, attests to the Jewish heritage, while the surname acknowledges his [native] village, Digodia. This intermingling of names reflects the manner in which the [local] Jews have commingled the regional culture with their very particular rituals, dissolving like sugar into water—in this particular case, carbonated water. . . .

For the longest time, the Bene Israel of Alibaug ran rice and oil-pressing mills. When the Digodkars’ mill shut down, Daniel Samson pursued a personal passion—creating flavorful drinks, first with a marble inside the bottle to contain the bubbles, later with sealed caps. When he died, his sister Mary Moses David took over. Her son Sydney is one of the last in the family—indeed in the community—left here today. . . .

While Alibaug once had the highest concentration of Jews in the area, most of them, including the Digodkars, have now emigrated to Israel.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.