What with anti-Semitism on both left and right, economic stagnation, and demographic decline, European Jewry faces dim prospects, writes Joel Kotkin:

Perceptions of Jewish success combined with a weak economy and the shrinkage of the middle class have ignited a resurgence of right-wing populism across the continent. In some countries, notably Russia, Poland, Belgium, and parts of Germany, anti-Semitism of the traditional right-wing variety has been mainstreamed, often by nationalist parties such as the AfD in Germany, the Freedom Party in Austria, and Jobbik in Hungary.

This development is most notable in Eastern Europe, where economic conditions are less than ideal. Asked whether “Jews have too much power in the business world,” according to a recent Anti-Defamation League survey, 72 percent of Ukrainians agreed, as did 71 percent of Hungarians, 56 percent of Poles, and 50 percent of Russians. . . . [A] third of Austrians, according to a recent CNN Poll . . . complain Jews have too much influence in finance, as did a quarter of French and German respondents.

Contemporary leftist hatred of Jews has its roots in the post-Stalin alliance with Arab nationalist and Islamist regimes seeking to obliterate Israel. . . . As the famous Nazi-hunters Serge and Beate Klarsfield told me and my wife over two decades ago in Paris, French leftists would see huge potential in appealing to Muslims who now outnumber Jews by roughly ten to one. Although often out of sync with the very liberal social agenda of the European left, Muslims increasingly constitute a powerful constituency for French socialists, who have been losing ground among their traditional white working-class base in recent elections.

Over the long term, if current trends hold, the Jewish future will be essentially that of Israel. . . . Many in these countries may well say “good riddance” to the Jews, but it represents a tragedy not only for the Jewish people but for Europe and the world.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.