In 2020, the sale of alcoholic beverages at bars and restaurants, normally a crucial part of producers’ revenue, cratered because of the coronavirus—and kosher wine was no exception. Yet kosher wineries have for the most part survived. Joshua London explains how:

Of course, wine—like most agricultural products—is largely a multiyear, long-term endeavor, allowing for a certain resiliency to temporary shocks. As Rabbi Nachum Rabinowitz, senior rabbinic coordinator and wine expert for the Orthodox Union, put it: “The wine industry requires long-term planning, and projection—and some would say, given the uncertainties natural to agriculture, and the often fickle nature of consumer tastes, it’s more like guesswork or betting—but regardless it requires some longer-term thinking. So, while everything was disrupted in 2020, kosher wine production and sales did not stop.”

Losing out [during the spring of 2020] were smaller or newer brands, the sorts of wines that usually require a bit of effort, storytelling, and substantive engagement with the customer, often aided by in-store tastings. Premium brands stagnated completely. Then “by mid-summer,” [the owner of a New Jersey kosher wine shop] noted, “folks finally began shifting back to something closer to what we were used to” in their consumer buying practices, including a return to sales of premium-priced wines.

In Israel, meanwhile, there has been a major shift in the way wine is consumed:

[According to] Adam S. Montefiore, an Israeli wine-industry consultant and prolific wine writer, . . . “Israelis have learned to drink at home, to have wine as part of their home routine—understanding that it’s OK to drink wine at home and share it with their family. That’s a big change. Probably the single most positive trend, and one that is likely to stay.”

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.