Tunisia is home to the second-largest Jewish community in the Arab world, and the Tunisian island of Djerba is home to one of Africa’s oldest synagogues, the site of an annual Jewish pilgrimage. As Kersten Knipp explains, “religious legend has it [that] the 2,500-year-old place of worship—known as the Ghriba synagogue in Arabic—was built using remnants of the first Jewish temple in Jerusalem.” This year, between four and five thousand visitors are expected participate in a yearly festival held on the island, following a two-year hiatus due to the coronavirus. Knipp sketches the recent history of Tunisia’s Jews, the synagogue, and the pilgrimage, along with the regional tensions this history reflects.

After Tunisia became independent from France in 1956, many Tunisian Jews left the country. The economic situation in Tunisia was difficult then, and there [was also increased hostility toward] the Jewish community [on the part of] Tunisia’s Muslim majority after the state of Israel was founded in 1948. Tunisian Jews found themselves marginalized and under pressure to emigrate. A second large wave of migration of Tunisian Jews followed in 1967 after the Six-Day War.

In 2002, the Djerba synagogue was the target of a terrorist attack when an extremist rammed a truck loaded with liquid propane into the building. The explosion killed nineteen people, including fourteen tourists from Germany. The extremist organization al-Qaida claimed the attack. In January 2018, petrol bombs were thrown at a Jewish school on Djerba. There were no injuries, although the school was damaged.

Before being elected to office in 2019, the current president of the country, Kais Saied, said he would not allow anyone holding an Israeli passport to enter Tunisia—not even to visit the Djerba synagogue. His statement was an apparent reaction to the ongoing normalization of ties between Israel and some Arab states, including Tunisia’s neighbor, Morocco. Asked about the . . . Abraham Accords during a presidential debate in 2019, Saied replied, “normalization is the wrong word to use. We should be talking about high treason.”

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.