On Monday, a German organization that monitors anti-Semitism reported that, in the first half of 2022, there were 450 anti-Semitic incidents in Berlin, including 97 physical and verbal attacks on individual Jews. Ben Cohen observes:

While many of the incidents were triggered by the Israel-Palestinian conflict, several more involved Holocaust denial—a crime in Germany—and the abuse of the Holocaust by activists protesting the public-health measures introduced by the government to counter the COVID-19 pandemic.

The increasing willingness of offenders to make their anti-Semitic convictions public reflects the further erosion of Germany’s postwar taboo against anti-Semitism, which crystallized in the wake of the Holocaust. According to data released by the Federal Criminal Police Office in October, more than 1,500 anti-Semitic attacks had already been recorded around the country during 2022—an average of five per day.

At the same time, the German media have been awash with headlines about anti-Semitism throughout the year. . . . Anti-Semitic rhetoric has even been aired in the presence of the country’s leader, Olaf Scholz. In June, a smarting yet silent Scholz stood alongside the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas at a press conference in Munich where the latter accused Israel of having perpetrated “50 Holocausts” against the Palestinians.

Germany enters 2023 with the very real prospect that, when it comes to anti-Semitism, next year could well be worse than this one.

Last week, Jordanian police arrested sixteen members of the country’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood for acquiring explosives, trying to manufacture drones, and planning rocket attacks. The cell was likely working in coordination with Hamas (the Palestinian offshoot of the Brotherhood) and Hizballah, and perhaps receiving funding from Iran. Ghaith al-Omari provides some background:

The Brotherhood has been active in Jordan since the 1940s, and its relations with the government remained largely cooperative for decades even as other political parties were banned in the 1950s. In exchange, the Brotherhood usually (but not always) supported the palace’s foreign policy and security measures, particularly against Communist and socialist parties.

Relations became more adversarial near the turn of the century after the Brotherhood vociferously opposed the 1994 peace treaty with Israel. The Arab Spring movement that emerged in 2011 saw further deterioration. Unlike other states in the region, however, Jordan did not completely crack down on the MB, instead seeking to limit its influence.

Yet the current Gaza war has seen another escalation, with the MB repeatedly accusing the government of cooperating with Israel and not doing enough to support the Palestinians.

Jordanian security circles are particularly worried about the MB’s vocal wartime identification with Hamas, an organization that was considered such a grave security threat that it was expelled from the kingdom in 1999. The sentiment among many Jordanian officials is that the previous lenient approach failed to change the MB’s behavior, emboldening the group instead.