Non-Jews Have a Moral Duty to Fight Anti-Semitism

On Friday, Buckingham Palace released its list of those who will receive knighthoods and similar honors from Charles III in 2022—which includes Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis as well as the president of the Board of Deputies of British Jews (Anglo-Jewry’s main communal organization) Marie van der Zyl, her predecessor Jonathan Arkush, and a few other prominent Jews who have been vocal in opposing anti-Semitism. Stephen Daisley observes:

They are not the only British Jews to be acknowledged on the New Year honors list but they have in common a commitment to confronting anti-Semitism and a record of making people in power take notice of the problem. In recognizing their efforts, the honors committee is expressing admiration for their public service and an affinity with the cause of fighting anti-Semitism. This is all well and good but it’s not enough. It’s not enough to give recognition or solidarity to Jews then go back to letting them tackle anti-Semitism on their own. Anti-Semitism and its suppression is not a “them” thing but an “us” thing.

The first six months of 2022 saw 786 anti-Semitic incidents in the UK, four in five of them taking place offline and one in ten involving assaults. Although this marked a reduction on the first half of 2021, another disturbing trend emerged: where age could be ascertained, one in five perpetrators were under the age of eighteen.

Commending Jews for standing up to all this hatred is like applauding when the woman you’re watching being mugged across the street gets a decent punch in. Challenging anti-Semitism is a moral imperative for non-Jews and one that is growing more urgent by the day.

Read more at Spectator

More about: Anglo-Jewry, Anti-Semitism, King Charles III

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF