The Return of the Jews to Portugal

Jews have lived in Portugal since at least the 5th century CE. In the late 15th century, the Jewish population peaked as thousands of Spanish Jews entered the country fleeing persecution and then the expulsion of 1492. Only five years later, the Portuguese king decreed that all his Jewish subjects had to be baptized, after which Judaism became illegal—leading to the relatively high number of crypto-Jews in the country. Laurence Julius describes the revival of the Jewish community in the city of Porto:

Over 300 years [after the forced conversion], Jews returned to Porto from the communities of North Africa. Records show there was a small Sephardi community in Porto in 1867. More familiar names appear, like Azulay, Amzalag, Benhanon, Cohen, and Ohayon. At the turn of the 20th century, there was an influx of Ashkenazi Jews from across Eastern Europe.

The community was reinvigorated by Arthur Carlos de Barros Basto, a former soldier who converted to Judaism in Tangier in 1920. His grandfather, on his death bed, had told him of his Jewish roots. Under Basto’s leadership, the community started the Jewish Community of Porto (CIP) in 1923. It focused on five issues: hospitals, Jewish instruction, Jewish observance, workers’ rights, and cemeteries.

In 1926, Basto joined with the Spanish and Portuguese Jewish community in London in a campaign to convert thousands of Marranos across Portugal to Judaism. In 1929, they began construction of the magnificent Kadoorie Mekor Haim Synagogue. It was completed in 1938, the last major synagogue built before World War II. During the war, Basto helped hundreds of Jews escape the Holocaust.

Read more at JNS

More about: Jewish history, Marranos, Portugal, Spanish Expulsion

Why Israel Has Returned to Fighting in Gaza

March 19 2025

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli Security