In New Zealand, home to nearly 10,000 Jews, 80 percent of Jewish parents say their children have experienced some sort of anti-Semitism—a massive jump since the handful of complaints before October 7. Nomi Kaltmann looks at the Jewish community’s suddenly grim outlook:

In Christchurch, on New Zealand’s South Island, members of the Jewish community have been shaken by an anti-Semitic attack against Canterbury Synagogue. The synagogue had its windows smashed, in an attack captured on CCTV. Shary Baker, the synagogue’s vice-president, feels that she is misunderstood as a Jewish person in New Zealand. “There is little to no education in schools here about minorities such as Jews,” she said. “Most [New Zealanders] aren’t taught about the Holocaust. Many non-Jewish students’ first experience of what Jewishness is or what a Jew is will be in the context of this current war. There is an issue that we are a minority here, but we are not viewed like a minority.”

While some education about Jews would no doubt be helpful, the experience of America and Westen Europe suggest that Holocaust education is hardly an antidote to anti-Semitism, and may simply encourage people to see Jews as potential victims. A bigger problem is the veto power anti-Semites have been given in public life:

When New Zealand’s Settlement Centre, a charity that offers free information and services to migrants, was set to reopen in July 2024 after a lengthy renovation, it was meant to be a festive occasion. However, the celebration, in the city of Hamilton, was abruptly canceled when Palestine Waikato, a pro-Palestinian group, threatened to protest the event. The controversy stemmed from the inclusion of an artwork by a New Zealand-Israeli artist. The artwork—which featured pomegranates and doves, but no explicit religious or political imagery—was part of a broader collection created by migrants to decorate the newly renovated center. However, Palestine Waikato charged that the artwork “does not represent culture or heritage, but symbolizes stolen Palestinian land, biodiversity, symbols, futures, and lives.”

And then there is the behavior of the New Zealand government. In the plus column, Kaltmann notes that Wellington officially designated Hamas a terrorist group shortly after October 7. But why hadn’t the previous decades of suicide bombing, torturing dissidents, and indiscriminate rocket fire convinced the government to take such a step?

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.