Iran Sanctions Are Already Crumbling

In accordance with the November 2013 interim agreement known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), which is still in effect, Iran was granted some limited relief from sanctions. But ever since then, write Emanuele Ottolenghi and Saeed Ghasseminejad, Iran has been circumventing the remaining sanctions with abandon. This does not augur well for any prospective deal premised on the idea that sanctions will “snap back” if Iran fails to uphold its obligations:

Iran’s [recent] economic windfall . . . goes well beyond the monthly cash transfers and temporary easing on trade stipulated in the JPOA. . . . [Tehran’s] gains are only partly due to sanctions relief: its improved position also results from lax sanctions implementation by its neighbors, reluctance by European authorities to discourage their own economies from trading with the Islamic Republic, and Tehran’s fine-tuning of its talent for bypassing sanctions. As a result, the interim nuclear deal looks increasingly like a slow-motion funeral procession for the sanctions regime. . . .

Direct trade [with Iran] is also getting a push from the new psychological environment that the interim deal has created. Few in Europe believe the sanctions will remain, and many are exploring future commercial opportunities. Meanwhile, Europe’s bilateral trade with Iran is climbing back to pre-sanctions levels—further evidence that banking sanctions are no longer effective. . . .

The Obama administration may still believe it is able to snap sanctions back at any time if Iran cheats on its commitments under a final agreement. Developments thus far under the interim deal suggest otherwise.

Read more at Business Insider

More about: European Union, Iran sanctions, Iranian nuclear program, Politics & Current Affairs, U.S. Foreign policy

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF