Ephraim Asculai, an expert on atomic energy, details the numerous flaws that render the agreement powerless to prevent the Islamic Republic from continuing work on its nuclear-weapons program (article begins on p. 23):
[According to the terms of the deal], only the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can ask for access [to a suspected nuclear site], and [even then] it must provide reasons for this request. . . . [B]oth conditions pose serious problems. As an example, let us assume that the U.S. intelligence community receives sensitive source-verified information that Iran is setting up an installation at a hitherto unknown site. The U.S. would then need to convince the IAEA, which would in turn need to divulge this information to Iran. The Iranians would then deny the entire claim and refuse entry to IAEA inspectors at the suspect site and the area around it. In addition, one must remember that the IAEA is not above politics, and there have been past occurrences when its director-general did not act according to the evidence and refused to indict Iran for incidents of non-compliance. . . .
[Furthermore], Iran would have 24 days to prepare for the IAEA’s arrival. This would be insufficient time for hiding or removing large-scale facilities such as nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants. . . . . However, smaller-scale prohibited facilities and activities . . . can be removed and/or hidden from sight within this period. These could include small-scale experimental setups, or computers with relevant software, which could be easily removed before an inspection. For the Iranians this would constitute a cat-and-mouse exercise, but for the inspectors this would be a predestined failure. Only inspections based on the “anywhere, anytime” principle would enable IAEA inspectors to perform their duties satisfactorily.
Read more on Tower: http://www.thetower.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Tower-Special-Briefing-on-Iran-Nuclear-Deal.pdf