The Corker-Cardin act, passed in May, requires that the Iran deal be presented to Congress in its entirety and gives Congress a 30-day window in which to approve or disapprove it. Eugene Kontorovich argues that, until Congress has seen the “side-deals” between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the executive branch has not fulfilled the terms of Corker-Cardin, and therefore cannot remove sanctions:
The only reason the president can waive sanctions is because Congress has authorized it. Corker-Cardin modifies and narrows that authorization by conditioning it on congressional review of the entire Iran deal. [In other words], it is delegating to him the power to waive sanctions, provided he allow for congressional review of the deal. . . . Since sanctions are fundamentally in Congress’s exclusive power, [as outlined in Article I of the Constitution], it can certainly narrow the scope of its delegation [of this power to the president] in this way. . . .
Indeed, it would raise massive [questions about Congress’s powers as described in] Article I if Congress cannot condition delegations of foreign commerce and tariff powers on executive actions that allow for meaningful congressional monitoring and review of the delegation and its ongoing wisdom. [Through the Corker-Cardin Act], Congress is not imposing conditions on the executive’s exercise of his powers, but on its exercise of its own powers.
Kontorovich argues that Congress could sue the president over this issue, and notes that “a credible legal challenge to the Iran deal has substantial value to opponents even absent a high chance of ultimate victory.”
Read more on Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/09/17/legislative-history-and-congresss-increasingly-strong-case-vs-sanctions-relief/?postshare=8041442497963505