Since 2012, relations between Hamas and its erstwhile patron Iran have been chilly, mainly because of the latter’s support for Bashar al-Assad. The Islamic Republic briefly tried to cultivate Palestinian Islamic Jihad as its main Gazan client, but found it insufficiently pliable. Now, writes Ehud Yaari, Iran is investing in an Islamic Jihad splinter group:

Over the past year and a half, the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, assisted by . . . Hizballah, has financed and provided media exposure to the al-Sabirin (“the Patient Ones”) movement in the Gaza Strip. This new militant group seeks to emulate Hizballah and Iraqi Shiite militias such as the Badr organization, known for its blatant pro-Iranian sentiments. Iran hopes that al-Sabirin will become a reliable proxy militia in Gaza.

Al-Sabirin is headed by Hisham Salem. . . . Salem, now in his early 50s, is a little-known former mid-level commander of Islamic Jiahd. . . . Rumors among Islamist circles in Gaza claim that Salem receives an annual budget of $10 million from Iran, typically smuggled in suitcases through the tunnels along the border with Egypt. . . .

It seems that Salem’s sponsors in Tehran and Beirut are disappointed . . . with how little progress he has made. Al-Sabirin remains nearly unrecognized by most Palestinians. . . . Nevertheless, Iran most likely regards al-Sabirin as an extremely useful tool to help keep Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in line by signaling to them that it has alternatives. Thus, the survival of Salem’s project seems guaranteed for the foreseeable future. In that regard, the United States should keep an eye on this group before it becomes the powerful militia that Iran and Hizballah are seeking to create, and before al-Sabirin obtains a solid foothold in the Gaza Strip.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.