Since 2012, relations between Hamas and its erstwhile patron Iran have been chilly, mainly because of the latter’s support for Bashar al-Assad. The Islamic Republic briefly tried to cultivate Palestinian Islamic Jihad as its main Gazan client, but found it insufficiently pliable. Now, writes Ehud Yaari, Iran is investing in an Islamic Jihad splinter group:

Over the past year and a half, the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, assisted by . . . Hizballah, has financed and provided media exposure to the al-Sabirin (“the Patient Ones”) movement in the Gaza Strip. This new militant group seeks to emulate Hizballah and Iraqi Shiite militias such as the Badr organization, known for its blatant pro-Iranian sentiments. Iran hopes that al-Sabirin will become a reliable proxy militia in Gaza.

Al-Sabirin is headed by Hisham Salem. . . . Salem, now in his early 50s, is a little-known former mid-level commander of Islamic Jiahd. . . . Rumors among Islamist circles in Gaza claim that Salem receives an annual budget of $10 million from Iran, typically smuggled in suitcases through the tunnels along the border with Egypt. . . .

It seems that Salem’s sponsors in Tehran and Beirut are disappointed . . . with how little progress he has made. Al-Sabirin remains nearly unrecognized by most Palestinians. . . . Nevertheless, Iran most likely regards al-Sabirin as an extremely useful tool to help keep Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in line by signaling to them that it has alternatives. Thus, the survival of Salem’s project seems guaranteed for the foreseeable future. In that regard, the United States should keep an eye on this group before it becomes the powerful militia that Iran and Hizballah are seeking to create, and before al-Sabirin obtains a solid foothold in the Gaza Strip.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”