While it is stoking the flames of jihad in Syria by supporting Bashar al-Assad, Russia also faces a growing jihadist threat within its own borders. Leon Aron writes:

Today, an estimated 20 million Muslims live in Russia, up from 14.5 million in 2002. While the vast majority of these men and women are peaceful, a small but growing number follow the fundamentalist teachings of Salafism and Wahhabism, ultra-conservative movements within Sunni Islam. . . . The impact of that radicalization is already apparent in central Russia, home to the Tatars, Russia’s largest Muslim ethnic group. . . .

International terrorist organizations have taken notice and have begun to ramp up their activities in Russia. Moscow has become the base of operation for an estimated 300 to 500 Islamic State recruiters. . . .

The Russian foreign ministry estimates that there are 5,000 people from Russia and the former Soviet Union fighting alongside Islamic State. (Independent observers put the number as high as 7,000.) Today, Russian is the third-most-popular Islamic State language, after Arabic and English. Russian graffiti reportedly seen in Darayya, Syria, reads: “Today Syria, tomorrow Russia! Chechens and Tatars rise up! Putin, we will pray in your palace!”

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.