Analyzing the current strength of jihadist movements across the globe, Andrew Peek traces their origins to three events in 1979:

The Iranian revolutionaries had overthrown a close U.S. ally . . . and heir to a monarchical tradition that stretched back 2,500 years. And they had done it, seemingly, by faith. For those Arabs who were suffering under the stagnancy of one form of dictatorship or another, Iran’s revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini was an inspiration, Persian and Shiite though he was.

The second event began in 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The ragtag group of Tajik and Pashtun rebels successfully defying the mighty Soviet army were another powerful symbol, just like the Iranian Revolution. . . .

In 1979, apparently inspired by Khomeini, a group of radicals took over the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia by force, demanding the overthrow of the kingdom’s rulers. After several unsuccessful attempts, Saudi authorities regained control of the mosque; but to solidify its own position, the monarchy began to pump vast amounts of funding into promoting its own brand of extremely conservative Islam, Wahhabism, abroad. Schools, mosques, charities, prisons—all benefited from Saudi largesse as long as they adhered to the Wahhabi line. . . .

[If the war on radical Islamism is to be won], the 1979 roots—the symbols and the money—need to be pulled out of the soil.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.