Russia has made agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran to help them build nuclear reactors and develop civilian nuclear-energy programs. And unlike the U.S., Russia does not couple this sort of assistance with a host of restrictions to prevent power plants from being turned into bomb-making facilities. Moscow has also been selling sophisticated conventional weapons to Egypt and Iran. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates, for its part, told a U.S. congressman that, in light of the Iran deal, it no longer feels bound by its prior commitments not to enrich uranium. All this, write Yoel Guzansky, Zvi Magen, and Oded Eran, bodes ill for Israel:
Israel cannot ignore the procurement of advanced Russian weapons systems by its neighbors, or their accelerated entry into the nuclear field; these plans are liable to serve as a basis for obtaining greater know-how and as a cover for building nuclear-weapons capability, certainly if the transfer of know-how includes enrichment capability. For its part, Russia is being careful to maintain positive relations with Israel, . . . and the two countries are coordinating their moves in order to prevent a clash between their military forces in Syrian territory. At the same time, Israel expects Russia to take its security interests into consideration.
The two countries seemingly are willing to engage in dialogue that will address their spheres of interest, but it is doubtful whether Israel will be able to convince Russia to include restrictive clauses in its agreements with the countries in the region seeking nuclear reactors. Furthermore, even if Israel is able to influence Moscow to some extent, it is highly doubtful whether some of these countries, which have hitherto rejected American demands that they accept conditions and restrictions, will accept such demands from Russia.
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