To judge by the statements made by the president and secretary of state, U.S. Syria policy has shifted from supporting regime change to actively opposing it. Ari Heistein notes that this is testimony to Assad’s successful strategy of encouraging the expansion of Islamic State (IS) and then presenting himself as the only viable alternative to it. Some contend that leaving the Syrian dictator in power will bring benefits in the form of post-war stability. Heistein, however, argues that an Assad victory will bring no such thing:
[P]ost-war Assad will probably make pre-war Assad look like a dandy. If there is anything worse than a dictator who feels invincible, it is a dictator who is afraid of his own shadow. . . . [I]t is safe to assume that Assad will respond with extremely brutal force any time someone so much as mumbles a complaint.
The coherence of pro-regime forces, composed of numerous militias in addition to the Syrian Arab Army, is another major question mark. . . . [M]ilitias vaguely referred to as shabiha are more like criminal networks that have vested financial interests in the regime and serve as its enforcers. Will Assad’s tattered forces be able to control these armed groups once the war ends? . . . In 2013, a Syrian official predicted discord from within pro-regime militias saying, “After this crisis, there will be a 1,000 more crises—the militia leaders. Two years ago they went from nobody to somebody with guns and power. How can we tell these shabiha to go back to being a nobody again?” . . .
With such grim prospects for Assadistan, the regime hardly seems to be the choice for stability that its backers have framed it as. It is likely that the Syrian regime will deal ruthlessly with the instability caused by the dismal economic situation and the diffusion of weapons and power to local militias.
Read more on National Interest: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-expect-postwar-syrian-%E2%80%98assadistan%E2%80%99-15268