The Iranian elections, held last Friday, have been hailed by many observers in the West as a victory for “moderates,” with some even going so far as to claim the results as evidence of the success of American diplomatic outreach in producing a more friendly Islamic Republic. However, Eyal Zisser explains, such an analysis is deeply flawed:

Tens of millions of Iranians—many of whom badly want a new revolution to replace the Islamic Revolution that ruined all the good things in their homeland—flocked to some 53,000 polling stations across the country to express support for moderate candidates belonging to the reformist camp led by President Hassan Rouhani. And indeed, the initial results, which were most certainly fixed here and there as is the custom in Iran, revealed that Rouhani and his fellow reformist camp leader, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, did well. . . .

But we should question the meaning of this celebration of democracy, and we should wonder whether the results of the election . . . will really change the way Iran operates in the regional arena and with regard to Israel. Moreover, we should ask if these results mark the beginning of a countdown to the end of the ayatollahs’ regime. The answer to that question is “no.”

After all, there were thousands of candidates demanding real change who were banned from participating in this celebration of democracy in Tehran.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.