Islamic State (IS) has already managed to obtain chemical weapons and has put them to use in the battlefield. In Europe, meanwhile, it may have tried to target nuclear facilities in Brussels. While it is currently unlikely to obtain an actual nuclear weapon, write Emily Landau and Shimon Stein, one or another terrorist group could very well use radioactive material in an attack:

To be sure, the threat of nuclear terrorism is not new. . . . But events surrounding the Brussels attacks raise the possibility of intent being joined by capability, if Islamic State terrorists are able to exploit the security vulnerabilities of nuclear facilities, . . . either to attack these sites or steal materials from within. A radiological attack could occur through dispersion of radioactive materials from a drone . . . or by an attack on a nuclear facility that released these materials. . . .

The recent attempts in Brussels by members of Islamic State to sabotage and gain access to material and know-how in the nuclear realm highlight the urgency, and underscore that the international community must do its utmost at the national, regional, and global levels to deny the terrorists that possibility. . . .

What might be Israel’s contribution to these international efforts? Israel has been a part of President Obama’s nuclear-security initiative from the start, and has actively participated in all of the [relevant] summits with high-level delegations. Israel attributes great importance to the issue, especially in light of the increase in nuclear programs throughout the Middle East. [At the most] recent summit, Israel noted that it is prepared for the scenario of a radiological attack; moreover, it is prepared to help other states in the region prevent the smuggling of radioactive materials into their territory. Indeed, this is an issue that could be discussed in a regional framework, if a regional security dialogue were to be initiated in the Middle East.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.