Islamic State, like many terrorist groups, takes the Muslim holy month of Ramadan as an especially propitious time for murder. As this particular Ramadan draws to a close, IS-linked attacks have cumulatively claimed over 300 dead in Orlando, Istanbul, Dhaka, Baghdad, and Saudi Arabia. Max Boot draws some conclusions from this latest wave of bloodshed:

A common refrain . . . has been that these attacks are [a] response to the territorial losses that IS has recently suffered. . . . [A]nalysts and U.S. government officials suggest that IS is trying show it is still relevant by expanding operations outside its core “caliphate.” That may well be the case. Or it may be that IS has been planning a campaign of terrorist attacks abroad all along and would have carried them out whether it was losing ground or not. We simply don’t know enough to offer a definitive answer.

The fact remains that, even in its currently weakened condition, IS is the most potent terrorist group on earth—indeed, perhaps the strongest in history. . . . It has the potential to wreak havoc for years to come, in whatever form it takes. Obviously it would be greatly advantageous to destroy its physical control of territory in Iraq and Syria—this is what makes possible its huge stream of income (which comes from “taxation” of the people under its control and various criminal rackets, as well as oil production) and provides it with space to train and indoctrinate recruits. It also contributes to the aura of success that has been such a big part of its allure for would-be terrorists around the world.

But while destroying the caliphate will undoubtedly diminish the IS threat, it probably won’t eliminate that threat. Like al-Qaeda, of which it was once an affiliate, IS shows a dismaying ability to adapt to adversity. . . .

[And] even if the IS threat is eventually diminished, other terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda wait in the wings. Indeed, the greatest beneficiaries of the anti-IS campaign in Iraq and Syria may be other Sunni and Shiite terrorist organizations that are eager to rush into the vacuum.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.