Earlier this month, Nusra Front, the main al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, renamed itself Jabhat Fath al-Sham in a public statement that, on its face, would indicate a break with its parent organization. This fits neatly with the conventional wisdom that al-Qaeda has become a second-tier player, unable to keep up with the more popular and powerful Islamic State (IS). But, argue Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, the conventional wisdom is wrong: al-Qaeda has routed Islamic State in Africa, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan while establishing important footholds in Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere; meanwhile, the renaming of Nusra Front was likely mostly for show:
Rather than trying to replicate IS’s model, al-Qaeda took the exact opposite approach. Al-Qaeda reduced its public profile, downplayed its successes rather than publicizing them, and embedded further within local populations. In this way, al-Qaeda presented itself to the world as a more palatable alternative to its bloodthirsty rival. . . .
Even when IS was at its peak, the vast majority of al-Qaeda affiliates refused to defect, and instead hunted down and neutralized IS sympathizers. Now that IS is demonstrably losing territory in Syria, Iraq, and Libya all at once, its chances of wooing al-Qaeda affiliates are even further diminished. It is IS’s global network, not al-Qaeda’s, that is now vulnerable to fragmentation. . . .
The alleged dissociation from al-Qaeda [in Syria] may open up [the newly minted] Jabhat Fath al-Sham to deeper cooperation with other rebel groups and greater support from external sponsors. Al-Qaeda theoreticians have made clear that they expect this precise benefit. . . .
Today al-Qaeda seems to be the strongest it has been since 9/11, and is arguably in the best shape it has known in its history.
Read more on Hudson Institute: http://www.hudson.org/research/12788-how-al-qaeda-survived-the-islamic-state-challenge