On September 18, the Iranian supreme leader gave a speech to officers of the Revolutionary Guard Corps arguing that investment in the military must take precedence over allocating funds toward economic development. He then cited the example of Germany and Japan, both of which, after suffering from a crushing and humiliating defeat in 1945, were forced by the victorious Allies to disarm. Eran Lerman comments:

As far as Khamenei is concerned, the bad guys won and the good guys lost in 1945, and the time has come to overthrow the entire post-war dispensation.

This position is, after all, in line with Iran’s denial of the Holocaust (recall the caricature competition designed to denigrate and diminish it) and exterminatory stance toward Israel. [These attitudes are] not personal quirks of the former president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. [They are part and parcel of] the position of Khamenei himself and of Ayatollah Khomeini before him. . . .

According to [the ayatollahs’ ideology], Iran has a religious imperative to reject all Western mores. For this to be possible, the revolution, even more than the state as such, must position itself as a strong military power in regional and global affairs. The alternative is unthinkable. . . . Military weakness, [the reasoning goes], would lead to moral weakness, a “cultural invasion,” and the loss of all that Khamenei and Khomeini have sought to establish.

There could be an opportunity here. Neither candidate for the U.S. presidency seems to have bought into the strange notion, implicit (and at times explicit) in the positions taken by President Obama and his inner circle, that Iran can serve as a useful counterweight to other forces in the region. Nor have they bought (yet) into the delusion that Iran’s revolutionary impulse can be assumed to be benign. The U.S. is thus still able to think of Iran as an enemy, which it is.

If so, the domestic tension and turmoil over the unfulfilled promise of economic relief, and over Khamenei’s demand for more and more sacrifices by the people (a “resistance economy,” as he calls it) can provide fertile ground for destabilization of the Iranian regime. Such an opportunity was lost in 2009. It need not be lost again.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.