Founded in 1971 to combat white-supremacist groups, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) won a number of important legal battles against the Ku Klux Klan, various neo-Nazi groups, and other opponents of desegregation. Now it generates materials like its “field guide to anti-Muslim extremists”: a list of fifteen individuals that includes the historian Daniel Pipes, the apostate Muslim Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and the British Muslim critic of jihadism Maajid Nawaz. Among Nawaz’s crimes are having tweeted a cartoon portraying Jesus and Muhammad, “despite the fact that many Muslims see [such depictions] as blasphemous.” Nick Cohen comments on what he calls “the white left’s first fatwa”:

Nawaz . . . and his Quilliam Foundation have struggled against both the white far right and the Islamist far right. They have defended liberal Muslims and, indeed, all of us from lethal blasphemy taboos and the threat of terrorism. They respect freedom of speech, including the freedom of their enemies to speak. . . . They think they should try to stop young Muslims joining Islamic State, not just for the sake of the Yazidis they will take into sex slavery, or the civilians they will tyrannize and kill, but for the sake of the young Muslims themselves.

A significant faction on the left hates them for upholding the values they have forgotten, and will use any smear to denigrate them. . . .

In the liberal orientalist world view the only “authentic” Muslim is a barbarian. A battery of insults fires on any Muslim who says otherwise. They are “neoconservatives,” “native informants,” and “Zionists”; they are as extreme as the jihadists they oppose or, let’s face it, worse. In short, a section of the Western left has adopted the ideology of the Salafists, Khomeinists, and Islamists. . . .

Of course they could not leave alone Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who became an atheist and denounced the faith of her childhood, and is hated by a section of the white left for doing what they do all the time. That Hirsi Ali needs bodyguards to protect her from Islamist assassins in no way restrained our Alabama witch finders.

On Yom Kippur, Hizballah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel, with one drone hitting a retirement home in Herzliya, miraculously without casualties. Yesterday, however, proved less lucky: a drone launched by the Iran-backed group struck a military base, killing four and injuring another 58, about twenty moderately or seriously.

This attack reflects Iranian strategy: Israeli defensive systems are strong, but so are Iranian drones and missiles, and with enough attacks some will get through. As Ariel Kahana writes, such an approach is consistent with Tehran’s desire to fight a war of attrition, denying Jerusalem the chance to strike a decisive blow. Kahana explains how the IDF might turn the tables:

It’s worth noting that Iran’s strategy of wearing down Israel and other U.S. allies in the region is not merely a choice, but a necessity. Militarily, it’s the only card left in Tehran’s hand. Iran neither desires nor possesses the capability to deploy ground forces against Israel, given the vast geographical distance and intervening countries. Moreover, while Israel boasts one of the world’s most formidable air forces, Iran’s air capabilities are comparatively limited.

Israel’s trump card in this high-stakes game is its unparalleled air-defense system. For years, Iran had counted on its network of proxy organizations to provide a protective umbrella against Western strikes. However, a year into the current conflict, this strategy lies in tatters: Hamas is reeling, Hizballah is on the back foot, and the various militias in Iraq and Yemen amount to little more than an irritant for Israel. The result? Iran finds itself unexpectedly exposed.

And when it comes to direct attacks on Israel, Iran’s options may be limited. Its October 1 attack, which used its sophisticated Fateh-2 missiles, was more effective than that in April, but not much more so:

Oded Eilam, drawing on his experience as a former senior Mossad official, . .  estimates [Iran’s] stockpile of these advanced weapons is limited to between 400 and 800. With 200 already expended in a single attack, Iran’s reserves of truly effective missiles may be running low. This raises a critical question: can Iran sustain a prolonged ballistic exchange with Israel? The numbers suggest it’s capacity for attrition warfare may be more limited than it would like to admit.