Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as required by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the accompanying UN resolution, released its fourth report on Tehran’s compliance with the limitations set on its nuclear program. The report concludes that the Islamic Republic is following some of the terms of the deal, but also makes it clear that in other areas Tehran is stretching the limits and may even be violating the agreement. Perhaps more troubling, write David Albright and Andrea Stricker, is what the report leaves out:

The report does not discuss, and is cast in a way as to [create] doubt, whether the inspectors have visited Iranian military sites, including the Parchin site, as part of [the] legitimate need to verify bans on certain nuclear weaponization activities and develop confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activity as mandated by IAEA safeguards and reinforced by the Additional Protocol [to the agreement]. . . .

We have learned that Iran has used or will use an advanced IR-6 centrifuge for stable-isotope work under a special project with Russia. . . . This use of the IR-6 is at odds with the stated JCPOA requirements. However, we do not know if the Joint Commission [tasked with supervising the deal’s implementation] has made an exemption for the use of the IR-6 for stable-isotope production or otherwise interpreted this use of the IR-6 as “not incompatible” with the deal. . . .

The IAEA reporting continues to lack critical technical details about implementation of the agreement. The IAEA’s sparse and overly generalized reporting borders on deception by omission and is contradicted by independent reporting pointing to problems in the implementation of the JCPOA. . . . This continued lack of information in the IAEA reports combined with the ongoing secrecy surrounding the decision-making of the Joint Commission is a serious shortcoming in the implementation of the JCPOA and raises legitimate questions about the adequacy of Iran’s compliance.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.