The Crisis at the International Criminal Court Proves the U.S. and Israel Right

Nov. 11 2016

In recent weeks, South Africa, Burundi, and Gambia have all announced their intention to leave the International Criminal Court (ICC). Kenya and Namibia are considering exiting as well, and other African nations may follow. Why? Mostly because they’re reluctant to extradite the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, indicted by the court for his role in the genocide in Darfur, should he visit their countries. This collapse of the court’s authority, writes Ariel Bolstein, justifies both America and Israel’s longstanding refusal to accept its jurisdiction:

Israel and the U.S . . . recognized early on that the [ICC] would be used by an array of shadowy regimes, eventually becoming a weapon for the worst of criminals. . . .

[A total of] 139 countries supported the establishment of the ICC, mostly as a means of bashing their opponents. Some saw it as the ideal playing field for hurling accusations against Israel. . . . Israel’s enemies fantasized about seeing Israeli leaders and soldiers led into the courtroom in handcuffs. This court has been asked to investigate Israel at least twice, and no objections were made in response. In case you were wondering, the court is not investigating the massacre in Syria. The court is not even capable of arresting Bashir al-Assad, whose hands are stained with the blood of millions. Bring a ruthless tyrant to justice? No. Blame Israel? Most definitely.

The ICC has fallen victim to the same plague that [has undermined] international initiatives like the UN and UNESCO. All of these . . . started off as the initiatives of pure idealists, and were instantly hijacked by those with dark ulterior motives. . . . Israel was wise not to follow in the way of fools and become a part of this process.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Africa, ICC, International Law, Israel, Politics & Current Affairs, Sudan, U.S. Foreign policy

The Next Diplomatic Steps for Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab States

July 11 2025

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Gaza War 2023, Israel diplomacy, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict