While Bashar al-Assad’s brutal conduct of his war to regain control of Syria has turned much of Arab public opinion against him, many devotees of the Palestinian cause have either ignored his behavior or rushed to his defense. The resulting schism came to a head when Ali Abunimah, co-founder of the venomous anti-Israel website Electronic Intifada, reacted with scornful indifference to a picture of a wounded Syrian child. Jamie Palmer writes:

Given the reckless cynicism with which Electronic Intifada has used images of dead children [for political purposes, Abunimah’s] hypocrisy was resonant. Beneath his irritation and indignation, there seemed to lurk a certain resentment that Syrians were usurping the Palestinians’ rightful claim to be the world’s most pressing human-rights emergency.

As the row escalated, the left-wing blogosphere divided. Other writers at Electronic Intifada, Salon, and [the hard-left website] AlterNet who chimed in to support Abunimah’s opposition to a U.S.-enforced no-fly zone in Syria suddenly found their mailboxes and Twitter accounts filling up with furious accusations of treachery. . . . Then [the notorious anti-Semite] Max Blumenthal inflamed the row still further with an endlessly long two-part “exposé” of the Syrian opposition.

In part one, Blumenthal described a network of sinister groups, anonymous donors, wealthy exiles, government agencies, media dupes, and other interested parties conspiring to manipulate Western public opinion. . . . It was the usual boilerplate conspiracy theory, purporting to reveal that things are not as they appear, heavy on insinuation and ominous atmospherics, light on rigor and substance, and all informed by a generally adolescent misanthropy.

But in part two, Blumenthal sought to discredit the [Syrian] White Helmets, a volunteer group of citizen first-responders who risk death to rescue survivors of aerial bombardment. . . .

[It’s worth pointing out that] the anti-imperialist left’s position on Syria has been perfectly consistent with its previous history. During the cold war, the New Left considered capitalist democracy nothing more than a new kind of fascism disguised as freedom, while Zionism—in keeping with the Soviet anti-imperialist line—was a Western colonialist plot. Any regime, no matter how backward or barbaric, which opposed this twin threat was rewarded with reflexive sympathy, especially (but not exclusively) if that regime happened to be left-wing.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.