Since the Islamic Republic’s creation in 1979, writes Ray Takeyh, American policymakers have repeatedly erred by trying to play “moderates” vs. “hardliners” while shying away from using—or threatening to use—force. Donald Trump would do well to learn from his predecessors’ failures as well as their successes:

Iran should be treated as a unitary nation-state and not a collection of hardliners and moderates that American policy can manipulate to its advantage. The entire notion of Iranian factionalism must be reconsidered in the aftermath of the 2009 revolt, when the theocratic state purged the reformers from its midst. . . .

The George W. Bush administration provides a good case study in what works and what does not. America’s momentary military triumph in displacing the Taliban and Saddam Hussein unsettled the clerical regime, and Iran quickly suspended its nuclear program in 2003. Bush’s forceful denunciation of states that sponsor terrorism and pursue weapons of mass destruction was well-noted in Tehran. And yet, the administration soon fell into the quagmire of negotiations. By 2005, America set aside its forceful posture and sought to engage Iran in stabilizing Iraq and settling the nuclear issue. An Islamic Republic at ease with its revived fortunes responded by accelerating its nuclear activities and lacerating American forces in Iraq with its lethal Shiite militias.

The next lesson to remember is that the Islamic Republic is not interested in normalizing relations with the United States. For the past four decades, American presidents have hoped that offers of dialogue and the possibility of resumed relations would entice Iran into moderation. . . . The point that many White Houses have missed is that the Islamic Republic is a revolutionary state whose entire identity is invested in its hostility toward the West. For the clerical rulers, resumed relations with America are themselves an existential threat.

Examining the effects of Iran’s decision to launch nearly 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1, Benny Morris takes stock of the Jewish state’s strategic situation:

The massive Iranian attack has turned what began as a local war in and around the Gaza Strip and then expanded into a Hamas–Hizballah–Houthi–Israeli war [into] a regional war with wide and possibly calamitous international repercussions.

Before the Iranians launched their attack, Washington warned Tehran to desist (“don’t,” in President Biden’s phrase), and Israel itself had reportedly cautioned the Iranians secretly that such an attack would trigger a devastating Israeli counterstrike. But a much-humiliated Iran went ahead, nonetheless.

For Israel, the way forward seems to lie in an expansion of the war—in the north or south or both—until the country attains some sort of victory, or a diplomatic settlement is reached. A “victory” would mean forcing Hizballah to cease fire in exchange, say, for a cessation of the IDF bombing campaign and withdrawal to the international border, or forcing Iran, after suffering real pain from IDF attacks, to cease its attacks and rein in its proxies: Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

At the same time, writes Morris, a victory along such lines would still have its limits:

An IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a cessation of Israeli air-force bombing would result in Hizballah’s resurgence and its re-investment of southern Lebanon down to the border. Neither the Americans nor the French nor the UN nor the Lebanese army—many of whose troops are Shiites who support Hizballah—would fight them.