Since the Islamic Republic’s creation in 1979, writes Ray Takeyh, American policymakers have repeatedly erred by trying to play “moderates” vs. “hardliners” while shying away from using—or threatening to use—force. Donald Trump would do well to learn from his predecessors’ failures as well as their successes:

Iran should be treated as a unitary nation-state and not a collection of hardliners and moderates that American policy can manipulate to its advantage. The entire notion of Iranian factionalism must be reconsidered in the aftermath of the 2009 revolt, when the theocratic state purged the reformers from its midst. . . .

The George W. Bush administration provides a good case study in what works and what does not. America’s momentary military triumph in displacing the Taliban and Saddam Hussein unsettled the clerical regime, and Iran quickly suspended its nuclear program in 2003. Bush’s forceful denunciation of states that sponsor terrorism and pursue weapons of mass destruction was well-noted in Tehran. And yet, the administration soon fell into the quagmire of negotiations. By 2005, America set aside its forceful posture and sought to engage Iran in stabilizing Iraq and settling the nuclear issue. An Islamic Republic at ease with its revived fortunes responded by accelerating its nuclear activities and lacerating American forces in Iraq with its lethal Shiite militias.

The next lesson to remember is that the Islamic Republic is not interested in normalizing relations with the United States. For the past four decades, American presidents have hoped that offers of dialogue and the possibility of resumed relations would entice Iran into moderation. . . . The point that many White Houses have missed is that the Islamic Republic is a revolutionary state whose entire identity is invested in its hostility toward the West. For the clerical rulers, resumed relations with America are themselves an existential threat.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.