Since the beginning of the millennium, Orthodox Jews have begun to vote for Republicans in increasingly large numbers. The last election showed Modern Orthodox Jews in particular split between the two parties. In the current era of political polarization and growing estrangement between “red” and “blue” Americans, writes Chaim Saiman, Modern Orthodoxy may be having its political moment:

In 1960, about 5 percent of the population cared whether their children married a member of the other political party. There were certainly disagreements about policy, but politics were not constitutive of identity. By 2008 this proportion grew significantly. In that year, 20 percent of Democrats and 27 percent of Republicans reported they would care if a child married a member of the other party. Polarization has continued apace; in 2010, 33 percent of Democrats and 49 percent of Republicans reported caring, and there are good reasons to think the percentages are even higher today.

Political identity has become totalizing as other forms of identity are being folded into it. Tell me if you are concerned about global warming, and I have a good chance of predicting your view on the estate tax, gun control, minimum wage, and healthcare. . . .

[By contrast], Modern Orthodoxy . . . lives between the two Americas. From a demographic perspective, its adherents seem “blue”: they tend to live in or near large, coastal cities, have high rates of college and graduate-school education at elite schools, and are well represented in the learned professions. At the same time, they also have much in common with “red” America. They are religious believers who value faith and faith communities, believe in strong traditional families, and support Israel and its specifically Jewish identity.

[But they are also] a divided community, which in this context is beneficial. Many post-election analyses relate America’s polarization to the fact that we increasingly live, work, and socialize among those we identify with politically. Add in media fragmentation, and red and blue Americans simply live in different ecosystems. In many ways, this applies to American Judaism as a whole, but Modern Orthodoxy is a particularly tight-knit community that divides [relatively] evenly among liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Most Modern Orthodox Jews can identify someone whom they not only know but respect from a moral, religious, and intellectual perspective and who voted for a different candidate [from theirs]. It is precisely because of this mutual respect that they can disagree without impugning the good faith and reasonableness of their interlocutors and without sacrificing admiration, friendship, and trust. In the current climate, this is both rare and valuable.

Why, ask many Israelis, can’t we just end the war, let our children, siblings, and spouses finally come home, and get out the hostages? Azar Gat seeks to answer this question by looking at the possible costs of concluding hostilities precipitously, and breaking down some of the more specific arguments put forward by those who have despaired of continuing military operations in Gaza. He points to the case of the second intifada, in which the IDF not only ended the epidemic of suicide bombing, but effectively convinced—through application of military force—Fatah and other Palestinian factions to cease their terror war.

“What we haven’t achieved militarily in Gaza after a year-and-a-half probably can’t be achieved.” Two years passed from the outbreak of the second intifada until the launch of Operation Defensive Shield, [whose aim was] to reoccupy the West Bank, and another two years until the intifada was fully suppressed. And all of that, then as now, was conducted against the background of a mostly hostile international community and with significant American constraints (together with critical assistance) on Israeli action. The Israeli chief of staff recently estimated that the intensified Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip would take about two months. Let’s hope that is the case.

The results of the [current] operation in [Gaza] and the breaking of Hamas’s grip on the supply routes may indeed pave the way for the entry of a non-Hamas Palestinian administration into the Strip—an arrangement that would necessarily need to be backed by Israeli bayonets, as in the West Bank. Any other end to the war will lead to Hamas’s recovery and its return to control of Gaza.

It is unclear how much Hamas was or would be willing to compromise on these figures in negotiations. But since the hostages are its primary bargaining chip, it has no incentive to compromise. On the contrary—it is interested in dragging out negotiations indefinitely, insisting on the full evacuation of the Gaza Strip and an internationally guaranteed cease-fire, to ensure its survival as Gaza’s de-facto ruler—a position that would also guarantee access to the flood of international aid destined for the Gaza Strip.

Once the hostages become the exclusive focus of discussion, Hamas dictates the rules. And since not only 251 or twenty hostages, but any number is considered worth “any price,” there is a real concern that Hamas will retain a certain number of captives as a long-term reserve.