Hanin Ghaddar, after interviewing a number of Hizballah fighters and commanders, sees ample evidence of their exasperation with their Iranian patrons, on whose behalf they have been fighting in Syria:

[I]n the early days of the war, the Hizballah-Iran dynamic changed quickly. The group’s commanders had already been working under the supervision of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for years, but [the commander of IRGC’s expeditionary wing Qasem] Soleimani reportedly began micromanaging their military operations to an unprecedented degree. This shift, coupled with Soleimani’s strict command over the consolidated Iraqi, Afghani, and Pakistani Shiite militias fighting in Syria, highlighted the complex relations between Persian and Arab Shiites. [Shiite] unity has been challenged by deep-rooted Persian-Arab tensions. . . .

Similarly, a number of . . . fighters have complained of being abandoned by their Iranian and Iraqi Shiite allies on the battlefield. Such incidents apparently led to many losses among Hizballah’s ranks, and some fighters subsequently refused to fight under Iranian commanders. Likewise, many interviewees complained about the “stingy” and “arrogant” manner in which Iranians treat Arab fighters.

Meanwhile, Ghaddar writes, Hizballah is losing some of its popularity among its Lebanese Shiite base, with possible consequences for Israel:

One thing that could revive Shiite public support for Hizballah at home is a confrontation with Israel. Although all-out war is not in the cards at the moment, post-Aleppo military operations in Syria have brought Hizballah forces back to Lebanon’s borders, creating an opportunity for renewed anti-Israel rhetoric and provocations.

Alternatively, if Washington turns up the heat on Hizballah amid increasing U.S.-Iranian tensions, the group may try to cast itself as a victim in order to regain public support. America’s interests would therefore be better served if its future actions against Hizballah included a plan for exploiting the fissures and contradictions within the Shiite community, e.g., by creating economic and employment alternatives for potential recruits. Otherwise, Hizballah will no doubt use any confrontation to bring the Shiites back to their sectarian base.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.