Hanin Ghaddar, after interviewing a number of Hizballah fighters and commanders, sees ample evidence of their exasperation with their Iranian patrons, on whose behalf they have been fighting in Syria:
[I]n the early days of the war, the Hizballah-Iran dynamic changed quickly. The group’s commanders had already been working under the supervision of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for years, but [the commander of IRGC’s expeditionary wing Qasem] Soleimani reportedly began micromanaging their military operations to an unprecedented degree. This shift, coupled with Soleimani’s strict command over the consolidated Iraqi, Afghani, and Pakistani Shiite militias fighting in Syria, highlighted the complex relations between Persian and Arab Shiites. [Shiite] unity has been challenged by deep-rooted Persian-Arab tensions. . . .
Similarly, a number of . . . fighters have complained of being abandoned by their Iranian and Iraqi Shiite allies on the battlefield. Such incidents apparently led to many losses among Hizballah’s ranks, and some fighters subsequently refused to fight under Iranian commanders. Likewise, many interviewees complained about the “stingy” and “arrogant” manner in which Iranians treat Arab fighters.
Meanwhile, Ghaddar writes, Hizballah is losing some of its popularity among its Lebanese Shiite base, with possible consequences for Israel:
One thing that could revive Shiite public support for Hizballah at home is a confrontation with Israel. Although all-out war is not in the cards at the moment, post-Aleppo military operations in Syria have brought Hizballah forces back to Lebanon’s borders, creating an opportunity for renewed anti-Israel rhetoric and provocations.
Alternatively, if Washington turns up the heat on Hizballah amid increasing U.S.-Iranian tensions, the group may try to cast itself as a victim in order to regain public support. America’s interests would therefore be better served if its future actions against Hizballah included a plan for exploiting the fissures and contradictions within the Shiite community, e.g., by creating economic and employment alternatives for potential recruits. Otherwise, Hizballah will no doubt use any confrontation to bring the Shiites back to their sectarian base.
Read more on Washington Institute for Near East Policy: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollah-losing-its-luster-under-soleimani