In recent weeks, Hamas sent two delegations to Cairo for meetings with high-ranking Egyptian officials, suggesting a thaw in the frosty relations of the past few years. If reports are correct, Hamas, in exchange for Cairo’s reopening trade through the Rafah crossing, agreed to cease cooperation with Islamic State and other jihadist groups in the Sinai Peninsula that have been making war on Egypt. Hamas also seems to have agreed to allow Cairo to serve as a mediator between it and the Palestinian Authority as well as between it and Israel. Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter explore the implications:
The emerging understanding between Egypt and Hamas . . . reflects political pragmatism at this specific point in time, but should not be interpreted at this stage as a profound strategic change on either side. Egypt’s softened stance toward Hamas does not moderate the struggle being conducted by the regime against the Muslim Brotherhood, [Hamas’s parent organization]. Similarly, Hamas’s willingness to accept some of Egypt’s security demands does not constitute a retreat from its commitment . . . to conflict with Israel. [A] considerable degree of suspicion, skepticism, and distrust still prevails between the two sides. . . .
From Israel’s perspective, the turnabout in Egypt-Hamas relations constitutes an important test for the flourishing security cooperation between Israel and Egypt, which face shared terrorist challenges in Sinai and the Gaza Strip. In the framework of this coordination, Israel must ensure that the security understandings taking shape between Egypt and Hamas do not leave the latter a “legitimate” opening for weapons smuggling, with Egypt turning a blind eye—intentionally or not—to a military buildup aimed against Israel. . . .
At the same time, if the understanding between Egypt and Hamas conforms to Israel’s security requirements, it is likely to serve Israel’s interests in several aspects. First, it can relieve the humanitarian distress in the Gaza Strip, which can affect Israel and the continuation of which is liable to fuel a new military outbreak with Hamas. Second, it can undermine the reciprocal relations between Hamas and the Salafist-jihadist groups in Sinai, which constitute a possible threat to Israel’s security and an obstacle to Egypt’s efforts to attain internal stability and improve its economic situation. Third, enhancing Hamas’s dependence on Egypt will weaken the organization’s motivation to begin a military conflict with Israel, and will reinforce Egypt’s status as an effective mediator capable of bringing a swift end to future crises.
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