After three months of intense fighting, the Iraqi army and its allies have successfully retaken the crucial city of Mosul from Islamic State (IS); currently a pause is in effect before they will cross the Tigris and try to subdue the eastern part of the city. Jonathan Spyer, having recently visited Mosul, does not doubt that they will win, but sees little hope of peace or national reconciliation:
It is an under-reported fact that the [Iranian-backed militias known as] “popular mobilization units” (PMU) are in the city, though not in the form of the well-known Iran-associated militias such as Kataib Hizballah and the Badr Organization. The PMU includes fighters from small Shiite communities in the Nineveh area [to which Mosul belongs], including members of the Turkmen and Shabak ethnic groups. . . . The PMU also includes a 40,000-strong Sunni component, consisting mainly of members of Sunni tribes who cooperate closely with the Shiite-dominated Baghdad government. I witnessed the presence of these fighters in the central part of Mosul.
These forces are under the overall command of the PMU, which is led in the field by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a well-known Shiite Islamist figure close to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. In the assessment of one Iraqi official I spoke to, the PMU is “all over” the offensive against IS in the Nineveh province.
Beyond the specific question of the PMU, representatives of . . . the [Iraqi] armed forces indignantly deny that their forces are operating on anything resembling a sectarian agenda inside Mosul. . . . Observation inside Mosul, however, reveals the frequent presence of Shiite sectarian symbols on vehicles of all units, including the Special Forces. Most ubiquitous among these are banners bearing the supposed visage of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of Muhammad and a figure of veneration for Shiites. . . .
It is important to understand that future developments—most importantly the defeat of IS, when it comes, as it will—are not likely to end the process of conflict in Iraq, but rather to usher in the next round. The underlying, stark dynamic of Iraq is one of fragmentation and sectarian politics. The effort to build a non-sectarian military presence in the form of the [elite] Iraqi Special Operations Forces has been partially successful, but it has not changed the bigger picture, and likely cannot.
Read more on American Interest: http://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/08/victory-in-mosul-wont-save-iraq/