After consolidating their reconquest of the eastern half of Mosul from Islamic State (IS), Iraqi forces have now crossed the Tigris and begun the battle for the western part of the city. Victory is near-certain for Iraq and its allies, writes Amir Taheri, but what follows it may prove more dangerous:
[S]taring at impending defeat, the hard-core IS fighters will retreat to Syria where they could retrench and remain in their deadly business for months, if not years. From its very beginning, IS has had an implicit non-aggression pact with the Syrian regime and its Iranian-backers. . . . In recent months, [this] arrangement . . . has been extended to include Russia as well. The Russia-Iran-Assad entente is likely to remain focused on fighting non-IS anti-regime groups, allowing IS to maintain a presence in Syria. . . .
[Meanwhile], the various Shiite armed groups that have taken part in . . . the battle are determined to claim as big a share as they can. If they bite off a bigger morsel than they deserve, they could transform the end of the war into a recipe for revanchism by the humiliated Sunni population. That sentiment could be deepened if the Islamic Republic in Tehran tries to grab a bigger share [for itself].
[But the real question is]: in whose name will victory in Mosul be claimed? Winning the war against IS in the name of Iraq as a united nation-state is one thing, winning it in the name of a coalition of disparate and at times even antagonistic ethnic and sectarian forces is quite another.
It may not be exaggerated to suggest that the right victory in Mosul could mark the rebirth of Iraq as a nation-state while the wrong victory could spell the end of Iraq as a unified entity. . . . Any “after-Mosul” strategy . . . must also include plans to weave Iraq’s Sunni community back into the fabric of national politics by granting them a genuine share of power and a clear vision for a future in dignity. And that, of course, cannot be done if the central power in Baghdad is atrophied by corruption, sectarianism, and incompetence.
Read more on Asharq al-Awsat: http://english.aawsat.com/2017/02/article55368052/mosul-certainties-uncertainties