Responding to the murderous suicide bombing in Manchester on Monday night, Max Boot notes that it is “difficult, but not impossible” to prevent such attacks:

Recall that Israel found itself under incessant assault from suicide bombers during the second intifada (2000-2005). Israeli security forces figured out how to defeat this terrible menace through a combination of offensive and defensive security measures. The number of suicide attacks in Israel fell from 53 in 2002 to none by 2009. Especially important in this success are the still-ongoing efforts by the IDF to police the West Bank and disrupt terror cells before they can strike. What the Israelis learned is that suicide bombers do not work alone: they require other people for indoctrination and preparation. Stop those other people—who are not suicidal—and you can prevent the human fuse from being lit. . . .

But even when individuals are arrested, they can be replaced so long as the ideologies of hate remain alluring. Islamic State (IS) may be losing its grip on the ground in Iraq and Syria, but there is a real danger that its virtual caliphate will long outlive the physical one. . . [I]t is [thus] necessary to convince those who might be sympathetic to IS and its ilk that these groups are not all they are cracked up to be.

In this regard, MBC, one of the most-watched TV networks in the Middle East, is performing a signal service by airing a 30-part series, Black Crows, that shows the unpleasant reality of life under IS’s rule; . . . assuming it is widely watched, it has the potential to strike a more potent blow against IS than any number of American bombs.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.