Perfect Security Is Impossible, but Suicide Bombing Can Be Prevented

Responding to the murderous suicide bombing in Manchester on Monday night, Max Boot notes that it is “difficult, but not impossible” to prevent such attacks:

Recall that Israel found itself under incessant assault from suicide bombers during the second intifada (2000-2005). Israeli security forces figured out how to defeat this terrible menace through a combination of offensive and defensive security measures. The number of suicide attacks in Israel fell from 53 in 2002 to none by 2009. Especially important in this success are the still-ongoing efforts by the IDF to police the West Bank and disrupt terror cells before they can strike. What the Israelis learned is that suicide bombers do not work alone: they require other people for indoctrination and preparation. Stop those other people—who are not suicidal—and you can prevent the human fuse from being lit. . . .

But even when individuals are arrested, they can be replaced so long as the ideologies of hate remain alluring. Islamic State (IS) may be losing its grip on the ground in Iraq and Syria, but there is a real danger that its virtual caliphate will long outlive the physical one. . . [I]t is [thus] necessary to convince those who might be sympathetic to IS and its ilk that these groups are not all they are cracked up to be.

In this regard, MBC, one of the most-watched TV networks in the Middle East, is performing a signal service by airing a 30-part series, Black Crows, that shows the unpleasant reality of life under IS’s rule; . . . assuming it is widely watched, it has the potential to strike a more potent blow against IS than any number of American bombs.

Read more at Commentary

More about: ISIS, Israeli Security, Middle East, Politics & Current Affairs, Second Intifada, Terrorism, United Kingdom

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF