The Saudi king recently named his son Mohammed bin Salman as his heir. According to most observers, Prince Mohammed has already been behind a number of the kingdom’s polices, ranging from the war in Yemen to the recent spat with Qatar. He is also behind an ambitious plan for much-needed economic and political reform, devised by international consulting firms and known as Vision 2030. Steven A. Cook comments:

[Vision 2030] sounds eminently reasonable, but [its] underlying logic is potentially destabilizing. What Mohammed bin Salman is attempting, taken as a whole, amounts to the radical transformation of long-established patterns that have guided the way business, politics, and policy are done in Saudi Arabia.

Any objective analysis of the Saudi economy would come to the conclusion that it is badly in need of reform. The dependence on hydrocarbons, entrenched interests of the royals, extensive patronage, and an elaborate process of consensus building have had distorting effects. Yet as much as these factors pose challenges to Saudi Arabia’s growth and the development of a dynamic economy, they serve another important purpose: they are critical to maintaining a system that has ensured domestic peace and stability for a long time. . . . With Mohammed bin Salman’s promotion, Vision 2030 will [undoubtedly] proceed—risks and all. . . .

Based on Mohammed bin Salman’s record, it is probably best for Saudis to hope that he can grow into his job. He has demonstrated some insight into what ails Saudi Arabia domestically, but his Vision 2030 requires diplomatic deftness rather than the raw power politics he has brought to bear thus far. One can appreciate his desire to break dishes, but it seems ruling Saudi Arabia requires balance. In some ways, Qatar and Yemen are laboratories for the new assertive, independent Saudi foreign and defense policies [that the crown prince appears to favor]. But these have not gone well for anyone and promise to do more damage if left unchecked.

There is a role here—if President Trump does not undermine it—for Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, or some combination of those three to help shape Mohammed bin Salman’s approach to the region. If they cannot, American policymakers will be confronted with a far bigger problem than an impulsive prince: the destabilization of Saudi Arabia.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.