While the term “lone wolves” suggests terrorists who have had no contacts with terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS), almost of all the perpetrators of recent attacks in Europe, Israel, and the U.S.—even those described as “lone wolf” attacks—were in direct communication (usually online) with recruiters and with Islamists in their own communities. In fact, writes Julie Lenarz, a web of connections links perpetrators of jihadist terror in France and Britain over the past five years. Lenarz argues that describing these perpetrators as “lone wolves,” despite ample evidence to the contrary, has the benefit of helping to disguise a real problem:

Even if we were to leave aside for a moment the practical nature of terrorist attacks, it would be wrong to characterize them on an abstract level as a series of isolated incidents. An individual might act completely isolated from any external network, and yet he would still be linked to the global Islamist insurgency. . . . It is important to understand the character of an insurgency. It is a movement that does not necessarily require a centrally planned or coordinated effort. But it cannot exist without a common denominator that creates a sense of belonging by ideologically connecting individuals. . . .

The “lone-wolf” paradigm . . . allows politicians to escape thorny cultural and political discussions. By pushing the narrative that an individual has acted alone, his act of violence is isolated from the extremist ideology that forms the backbone of groups such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda and, in return, does not raise difficult questions about how the violence we experience is linked to Islam. . . .

The “lone-wolf” myth also helps security services, which are overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of information, explain serious failures in intelligence that might have prevented an attack from taking place. Intelligence officers have identified 23,000 jihadists roaming freely in the UK. Due to capacity constraints, however, only 3,000 of them can be permanently monitored. Unlike terror cells that need to meet, or at least have members communicate with each other, lone wolves can operate without leaving behind any traces and are difficult, often impossible, to catch. But true “lone wolf” attacks are extremely rare, and in most cases there would have been information that intelligence services could have acted upon. . . .

Individuals who carry out an attack are often only the tip of the iceberg. They do not operate in a social vacuum and seldom act in complete isolation. If we are serious about getting at the roots of international terrorism, we must first acknowledge the true nature and magnitude of it.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.