Last month, the Islamic Republic fired seven of its newest model of Zulfikar ballistic missiles at Islamic State positions in Syria, not far from the U.S. zone of operations. Official Iranian media covered the missile launch with enthusiasm, although it seems that only one of the projectiles hit its target. Despite this apparently poor performance, argues Uzi Rubin, the fact that Tehran possesses such long-range, high-precision weapons should arouse serious concern:

To hit a single house from more than 6oo kilometers away, [as one of the missiles probably did], is far from trivial. In fact, it is a very significant development. As a military operation, Iran’s missile strike may have been a dud, but as a technical demonstration of the Zulfikar’s inherent capability, it may have been a step forward. . . . In any case, poor reliability can probably be cured by design refinements and further testing. If its basic design is sound, the Zulfikar can still become an awesome weapon.

While Israel is threatened by Iranian missiles from Lebanon and from Iran itself, it is not the intended target of the Zulfikar, which lacks the range to reach Israel from Iranian territory. Its intended target is probably Saudi Arabia, whose capital city, Riyadh, is about 700 km away from the Iranian shores of the Persian Gulf—well within [its] claimed range.

Iranian officials continue to cite Israel as its chief enemy in the region, but their missiles indicate that this is not exactly the case. A drizzle of Iranian-made missiles is currently hitting Saudi towns along the Yemenite border and spreading to the Saudi interior. Houthi rebels in Yemen have already launched Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia’s largest port city of Jeddah, its summer capital of Taif, and Riyadh itself at least twice.

But if Iran succeeds in setting up platforms for these missiles in the territories it controls in Syria, Lebanon, or even western Iraq, the danger to Israel will become that much greater.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.