The Iranian Bombing of a Jewish Center in Argentina Occurred in 1994. Iran Hasn’t Changed.

Twenty-three years ago, Iran through its agents in Hizballah bombed a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, killing 85 and wounding hundreds more. Iran has marked the occasion by saying that it is ready to work with Interpol to resolve the case. That’s nonsense, writes Matthew Levitt:

Tehran’s outreach . . . should be seen for what it is: The fox trying to weasel its way into the investigation of the raided henhouse. If Iran wants to help investigate the AMIA bombing, it should present the Iranians indicted for the crime to Argentine prosecutors. Anything else is hollow rhetoric.

The hypocrisy of Iran’s offer is further highlighted by the fact that it has continued to support Hizballah since 1994, as Levitt points out:

For example, on July 18, 2012—eighteen years to the day after the AMIA bombing—Hizballah operatives murdered six people and wounded many more in a bus bombing at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria. . . .

Beyond Europe, Hizballah activities continued unabated in South America. In November 2014, a Hizballah plot was foiled in Peru. More recently, a Hizballah operative based in the U.S. was sent by the group to carry out surveillance in Panama.

In the past five months, several other suspected operatives have been arrested in the U.S. for their alleged financial ties to Hizballah. Kassim Tajideen was extradited to the United States from Morocco in March 2017 and was charged with being a “prominent financial supporter of the Hizballah terror organization.” In June, Ali Kourani and Samer el Debek were arrested in New York and Michigan, respectively, for their alleged activities in support of Hizballah. Both were arrested on charges of “providing, attempting and conspiring to provide material support to Hizballah,” as well as receiving “military-type training from Hizballah.”

Read more at The Hill

More about: AMIA bombing, Hizballah, Iran, Politics & Current Affairs

Why Egypt Fears an Israeli Victory in Gaza

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.

Read more at Washington Examiner

More about: Egypt, Gaza War 2023, U.S. Foreign policy