How the “Alt-Right” Came to Love Syria’s Murderous Dictator

Aug. 15 2017

From hardcore neo-Nazis to David Duke to such newer faces as Richard Spencer, many members of what has been termed the “alternative right” have displayed an admiration for Bashar al-Assad. Since Assad is the head of a political party that combines nationalism and socialism, and has dedicated a great deal of effort to killing Jews, perhaps this should not be particularly surprising. Liz Sly and Rick Noack write:

Assad’s politics—and those of his father before him—have historically been associated more with the left than the right. His late father, President Hafez al-Assad, was the closest Middle Eastern ally of the Soviet Union throughout the cold war. The son has enjoyed the stalwart support of international leftists throughout his attempt to crush the six-year-old rebellion against his rule.

In recent months, however, Assad has [also] become an icon for the far right, whose leaders and spokesman have heaped praise on the ferocity with which he has prosecuted the war, his [alleged] role in fighting Islamic State, and his perceived stance against Muslims and Jews.

That Assad’s harsh methods have resulted in [hundreds] of thousands of civilian casualties seems only to have enhanced his stature. In a video posted on Twitter, three men who participated in the Charlottesville protests hailed Assad’s use of barrel bombs to subdue communities that turned against him. One is wearing a T-shirt that says: “Bashar’s Barrel Delivery Co.” . . .

The far right’s love affair with Assad [should] not be entirely unexpected. His Baath party is fiercely nationalist and ethnocentric, focused on the promotion of Arab identity. One of the few [other] political parties permitted by his regime and one of his staunchest supporters in the war is the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which drew the inspiration for its logo from the swastika.

Read more at Washington Post

More about: Alt-Right, Anti-Semitism, Bashar al-Assad, neo-Nazis, Politics & Current Affairs

Israel’s Syria Strategy in a Changing Middle East

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Donald Trump, Israeli Security, Syria, U.S. Foreign policy