Al-Qaeda’s Iraqi branch renamed itself Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and began distancing itself from its parent organization in 2006. It severed ties completely in 2014, when it declared a caliphate, violating orders from Osama bin Laden and his successors. Thanks to the CIA’s release of the trove of captured documents from bin Laden’s Pakistan redoubt, the relationship between the two terrorist groups, and bin Laden’s insights into the rival group’s vulnerabilities, have become clearer. Thomas Joscelyn writes:

[A]n initial review of the Abbottabad files suggests that bin Laden still considered the ISI to be part of his network at the time of his death. Regardless, bin Laden never would have approved of Islamic State’s caliphate declaration in 2014. . . .

“We need to fight in areas where we can gain points toward the creation of the caliphate-based state,” [wrote bin Laden and a deputy]. Yet “the enemy” could “easily destroy” any state lacking the “essential foundations to function and defend itself.” Although al-Qaeda viewed the United States as a weakened foe, the world’s only superpower was still strong enough to topple quickly both Saddam’s regime and the Taliban’s Islamic emirate. Bin Laden . . . warned that a newly declared caliphate would meet the same fate. . . . Bin Laden made a commonsense observation that resonates across many contexts: the “public does not like losers.” . . .

Despite its territorial setbacks, it is too early to pronounce total victory over Islamic State. As U.S. intelligence officials warned earlier this year, the organization likely retains enough personnel and resources to continue waging guerrilla warfare. And Islamic State’s fortunes are no longer confined to Iraq and Syria. Its enterprise is global, with representatives everywhere from West Africa to Southeast Asia. Its network in the West will also continue to bedevil European and American counterterrorism officials.

Still, bin Laden warned that the jihadists would not be able to hold onto their territory if they declared a caliphate. He was right. Al-Qaeda’s branches in Africa and the Middle East face their own hurdles, but they continue to follow his more patient approach. Time will tell if bin Laden’s longer-term plan for caliphate-building will bear fruit.

There is little doubt that if Hizballah had participated more intensively in Saturday’s attack, Israeli air defenses would have been pushed past their limits, and far more damage would have been done. Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, trying to look at things from Tehran’s perspective, see this as an important sign of caution—but caution that shouldn’t be exaggerated:

Iran is well aware of the extent and capability of Israel’s air defenses. The scale of the strike was almost certainly designed to enable at least some of the attacking munitions to penetrate those defenses and cause some degree of damage. Their inability to do so was doubtless a disappointment to Tehran, but the Iranians can probably still console themselves that the attack was frightening for the Israeli people and alarming to their government. Iran probably hopes that it was unpleasant enough to give Israeli leaders pause the next time they consider an operation like the embassy strike.

Hizballah is Iran’s ace in the hole. With more than 150,000 rockets and missiles, the Lebanese militant group could overwhelm Israeli air defenses. . . . All of this reinforces the strategic assessment that Iran is not looking to escalate with Israel and is, in fact, working very hard to avoid escalation. . . . Still, Iran has crossed a Rubicon, although it may not recognize it. Iran had never struck Israel directly from its own territory before Saturday.

Byman and Pollack see here an important lesson for America:

What Saturday’s fireworks hopefully also illustrated is the danger of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East. . . . The latest round of violence shows why it is important for the United States to take the lead on pushing back on Iran and its proxies and bolstering U.S. allies.