The recent terrorist attack in Manhattan could easily have been far deadlier, notes Graeme Wood, had the perpetrator followed the guidelines Islamic State (IS) distributed for vehicular rammings. But, Wood writes, it would be unwise to expect other jihadists to be so ineffective:

[A]s long as Islamic State’s attackers are idiots like Sayfullo Saipov, our societies can probably handle them. . . . The Idiots’ Crusade is a manageable problem.

Much less tolerable would be a campaign of competent terror—the kind of mayhem enabled by training, like that of the 2015 Bataclan killers in Paris, or by patient planning, like that done by Stephen Paddock in Las Vegas. There is not much to be done about the idiots, but their idiocy provides a natural limit to the damage they can do. As Islamic State loses territory, the greatest danger remains the prospect that some of the battle-hardened fighters will return home, raising the average IQ of attackers, and making possible attacks that would be many times deadlier than this one.

America’s strategy in Syria is to demolish Islamic State while minimizing the possibility that one of the smart terrorists will slip away. Eight people are dead, tragically, in lower Manhattan. That the number is not higher is a reminder of how important it is that that strategy be pursued with undiminished vigor.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.