Last Friday, Islamic State’s “Sinai Province” carried out a carefully planned terror attack on a Sufi mosque, killing over 300 worshippers. Examining its motivations, Yoram Schweitzer and Ofir Winter ask whether the attack will lead to a shift in how the Egyptian regime pursues its campaign against both Islamic State (IS) and the other terrorist groups operating within its borders:

From [IS’s] perspective, the attack was designed to serve several operational and ideological goals: first, to project a show of its strength at a time [when the organization] is being trounced in Iraq and Syria and challenged by competing terrorist groups (Egypt and Sinai are [also] home to groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood); second, to humiliate the Egyptian regime by portraying it to domestic and international publics as helpless, and to deal another blow to its efforts to rebuild the nation’s economy and tourist industry; third, to settle a score [with] locals cooperating with the regime’s struggle against terrorism . . . and to deter other groups from doing the same; fourth, to torpedo the understandings reached over the last year between the Egyptian regime and Hamas about increased supervision of the Gaza-Sinai border and opening the Rafah crossing [connecting Gaza to Egypt]; and, finally, to harm the believers in Sufism, seen by some Salafist jihadist groups as heretics who have deviated from the true path of Sunni Islam and are therefore subject to the death penalty. . . .

The increasing number of attacks in Sinai has forced the Egyptian regime to embark on a series of military operations against the jihadists, but despite the military efforts, attacks have continued unabated in the peninsula, taking a steep human toll, in particular of police and army personnel. . . . While the expanding Egyptian campaign against terrorism in Sinai succeeded in 2017 in eliminating many terrorists and senior leaders and reducing the number of attacks overall, the attacks that were carried out have become more focused and deadly. . . .

Egypt must make radical changes in how it fights terrorism in general and in Sinai in particular. The Egyptian security services are in urgent need of reorganization, closer coordination, and increased cooperation [among themselves].

[Furthermore, Egypt must have] high-quality, accurate intelligence, which makes it possible to target elements planning, assisting, and perpetrating the terrorism in a focused way, and distinguishing them from the population at large. This distinction is critical to reducing the civilian population’s motivation to cooperate with the terrorists and encourage the locals to help the authorities actively fight terrorism.

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.