Why Iranians Are in the Streets While Saudis Are—For Now—Content

Saudi Arabia is, if anything, less democratic than Iran. Its citizens have limited rights, and, like the Islamic Republic, its religiously conservative government imposes many restraints on its populace. So why, asks Elliott Abrams, are Iranians demonstrating against their rulers en masse while Saudis seem unperturbed by the status quo?

Part of the answer is found in the expectations game: while [the Saudi crown prince] Mohammed bin Salman (known as MbS) surprised Saudis by pushing unexpectedly for social and economic modernization, [the Iranian president Hassan] Rouhani promised both political and economic improvement and has not delivered on either. Popular patience with Rouhani has clearly run out. . . .

By contrast, it seems to many Saudis that the crown prince has figured out that change is the only thing that will save the House of Saud. The old model of elderly brothers ruling in succession, of an unproductive economy saved by revenues from $120-per-barrel oil, of the clerics preventing anything new that smacked of the 21st (or even the 20th) century, was becoming a formula for disaster. Time will run out some day for MbS if he cannot deliver on his promises. But young Saudis will give him the chance to try.

Beyond the issue of expectations there lies the critical question of legitimacy. The great sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset wrote in 1959, “Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.”. . . . In our Western view, democratic legitimacy is the best and strongest form, but monarchic legitimacy exists in several Arab nations, especially in the Gulf. . . . Iran today, [however], is a fake republic kept in place only by brutal repression. . . .

For now, Iranians are disgusted with the refusal of their rulers to allow change and reform despite their repeated promises, while Saudis are surprised and apparently pleased by their rulers’ insistence on change. Saudis will give MbS time, but their heightened expectations mean that if he fails and the kingdom starts returning to the past, there will be trouble in the streets.

Read more at Weekly Standard

More about: Arab Spring, Democracy, Hassan Rouhani, Iran, Politics & Current Affairs, Saudi Arabia

The Benefits of Chaos in Gaza

With the IDF engaged in ground maneuvers in both northern and southern Gaza, and a plan about to go into effect next week that would separate more than 100,000 civilians from Hamas’s control, an end to the war may at last be in sight. Yet there seems to be no agreement within Israel, or without, about what should become of the territory. Efraim Inbar assesses the various proposals, from Donald Trump’s plan to remove the population entirely, to the Israeli far-right’s desire to settle the Strip with Jews, to the internationally supported proposal to place Gaza under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA)—and exposes the fatal flaws of each. He therefore tries to reframe the problem:

[M]any Arab states have failed to establish a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan all suffer from civil wars or armed militias that do not obey the central government.

Perhaps Israel needs to get used to the idea that in the absence of an entity willing to take Gaza under its wing, chaos will prevail there. This is less terrible than people may think. Chaos would allow Israel to establish buffer zones along the Gaza border without interference. Any entity controlling Gaza would oppose such measures and would resist necessary Israeli measures to reduce terrorism. Chaos may also encourage emigration.

Israel is doomed to live with bad neighbors for the foreseeable future. There is no way to ensure zero terrorism. Israel should avoid adopting a policy of containment and should constantly “mow the grass” to minimize the chances of a major threat emerging across the border. Periodic conflicts may be necessary. If the Jews want a state in their homeland, they need to internalize that Israel will have to live by the sword for many more years.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Gaza War 2023, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict