Now that Islamic State (IS) has lost much of its territory in Iraq and Syria, Western countries—and Western Europe especially—are seeing the beginning of the return of thousands of their citizens who had gone to the Middle East to fight for the caliphate. Robin Simcox urges governments not to be forgiving to these IS alumni:

Western governments should have no trouble figuring out what to do with citizens who have hacked off the heads of aid workers, committed mass rapes, pushed gay people off buildings, or tried to erase the presence of religious minorities. Killing them on the battlefield is one option. If they are captured, legally detaining them is another. And if these fighters do make it home, their home countries should prosecute them. . . . What should not be an option is to treat the returning terrorists with ever-greater levels of tolerance. Yet that is the option a number of Europeans advocate.

Take Denmark. Its much-vaunted “Aarhus model” sees returnees from Syria essentially welcomed back without censure. Danish authorities treat returning fighters as naïve youths. They may be offered public housing and counseling to help them readjust to life back in Denmark. . . .

It would be a grave mistake to forget that IS and its supporters have brought bloodshed around the world, subjugating Iraqis and Syrians and slaughtering innocents in New York, Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, and countless other cities. . . . The convergence of foreign fighters that occurred in Syria was highly destructive—and nothing new. That phenomenon is fast becoming the norm. To varying degrees, it also occurred in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. European governments did not prosecute such travelers, so it will doubtless happen again—unless Western governments crack down on citizens who have joined terrorist groups.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.