The war between Islamism and the Western world (most often understood as the U.S. and Israel) has been going on since 1979, even if America only began fighting back in earnest in 2001. In an in-depth analysis, Max Singer evaluates the real threats posed by militant Islam but also the limits of its capabilities. He concludes that the movement in its various forms can cause untold harm to the West—especially if Islamist groups or countries obtain nuclear and biological weapons—but by its own standards can never win:

[T]he Islamist view of Islam implies that the ultimate survival of non-Muslim governments anywhere in the world would be a defeat for their cause—or a demonstration that their view of Allah’s requirements is wrong. Although many of the Islamist leaders have a great commitment to their cause, while much of the West, especially Western Europe, has lost its faith, Muslims have too little power—measured by economic strength, military capabilities, technological advancement, organization, population size, and competence—to take over the rest of the world. . . .

The understanding that militant Islam cannot win its war leads to a second fundamental perspective: in the long run the crucial struggle is within Islam, not between Islam and the rest of the world. The final defeat of Islamism will come only when sufficient elements of the Muslim world decide that they will no longer accept the problems and costs caused by the war and its interference with progress. In other words, the Islamist war has two components: physical actions and ideological conflict. Even when the physical actions are defeated, the internal ideological struggle can continue. . . .

An important feature of the long-term internal conflict within Islam is that Islamists suppress Muslim leaders and thinkers who oppose the war against the West. As a result, internal Muslim public debate, especially outside Asia, has been largely one-sided because most of the other side is afraid to speak. A key turning point will be when Muslim communities decide that it is no longer acceptable to suppress non-Islamist voices. There is reason to think suppression depends on unspoken acceptance by Muslim communities, and when that acceptance is withdrawn the suppression will gradually weaken and become less effective. . . .

To meet the Islamist ideological challenge, Western governments and leaderships need to stop giving legitimacy and help to local Muslim organizations dominated by Islamists like the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC).

As far as Israel is concerned, Singer argues that the Arab-Israeli conflict predates the rise of Islamism and could well outlive it. But he cautions against trying to fight the ideological war with Israeli concessions, for a simple reason:

Israel and Judaism are part of the Western (non-Muslim) world, and Israel is living on land that had been Muslim land for many generations. No Western evenhandedness between Israel and the Palestinians, or even support for the Palestinian cause, can exculpate Western responsibility for Israel’s existence. This anti-Western Muslim grievance can only be assuaged by Israel’s transformation into a Muslim state.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.